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Abstract
Orthodox game theory is sometimes criticized for its failure to single
out intuitively compelling solutions in certain types of interpersonal in-
teractions. The theory of team reasoning provides a resolution in some
such cases by suggesting a shift in decision-makers’ mode of reasoning
from individualistic to reasoning as members of a team. The existing
literature in this field discusses a number of properties for a formalized
representation of team’s interests to satisfy: Pareto efficiency, successful
coordination of individuals’ actions and the notion of mutual advantage
among the members of a team. For an explicit function of team’s goals a
reference is sometimes made to the maximization of the average of indi-
viduals’ personal payoffs, which meets the Pareto efficiency and (in many
cases) coordination criteria, but at times fails with respect to the notion of
mutual advantage. It also relies on making interpersonal comparisons of
payoffs which goes beyond the standard assumptions of the expected util-
ity theory that make numerical representations of individuals’ preferences
possible. In this paper we propose an alternative, rank-based function of
team’s interests that does not rely on interpersonal comparisons of pay-
offs, incorporates the notion of mutual advantage and satisfies the weak
Pareto efficiency and (in many cases) coordination criteria. We discuss
its predictions using a number of examples and suggest a few possibilities
for further research in this field.
1 Introduction
The standard rational choice theory is sometimes criticized for its inability to
single out what at times appears to be the only obvious choice to make in
games with multiple Nash equilibria. An example is the simple Hi-Lo game, in
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which two players independently and simultaneously choose one from a pair of
available options: Hi or Lo. If both choose Hi , they get a payoff of 2 each. If
both choose Lo, they get a payoff of 1 each. If one chooses Hi while the other
chooses Lo, they both get 0. The game is illustrated in Figure 1, where one of
the players chooses between two options identified by rows and the other — by
columns. The numbers in each cell represent payoffs to the row and the column
players respectively.
Hi Lo
Hi 2, 2 0, 0
Lo 0, 0 1, 1
Figure 1: The Hi-Lo game
The standard theory predicts that rational players will choose strategies that
together constitute a Nash equilibrium, in which each player’s strategy is a best
response to the strategies chosen by all other players. Here it is for both players
to play Hi or for both to play Lo: (Hi , Hi) and (Lo, Lo)1. Yet (Lo, Lo) does
not intuitively strike as a rational outcome in this game. It is true that if one
player expected the other to play Lo, then choosing Lo would be his or her best
response to the other player’s choice. In other words, choosing Lo would be the
rational thing to do. However, it would be odd if anyone formed an expectation
that a rational individual would play Lo in the first place. Experimental results
support this by revealing that over 90% of the time people do opt for Hi in this
game2.
This prompted the emergence of the theory of team reasoning which sug-
gests that certain features of the context in which interdependent decisions are
made may trigger a shift in peoples’ mode of reasoning from individualistic
best-response reasoning to reasoning as members of a team where a group of
individuals acts together in the attainment of some common goal3. By identify-
ing this goal with the maximization of the average of decision-makers’ personal
payoffs the theory can be operationalized to render Hi to be the only ratio-
nal choice in the Hi-Lo game for anyone who reasons as a member of a team.
Similarly, this allows to explain cooperation in the widely discussed Prisoner’s
Dilemma and the Stag Hunt games.
1These are Nash equilibria in pure strategies. There is a third equilibrium in mixed strate-
gies, in which players randomize between the two available options with certain probabilities.
Here and in the rest of this paper we focus solely on equilibria in pure strategies.
2See Bardsley et al. (2010) who, among a number of other games, report experimental
results from two versions of the Hi-Lo game where the outcome (Hi , Hi) yields a payoff of 10
while the outcome (Lo, Lo) yields a payoff of 9 or 1 to both players.
3For early developments of this theory see Sugden (1993, 2000, 2003) and Bacharach (1999,
2006). For some of the more recent work see Gold and Sugden (2007a,b), Sugden (2011) and
Gold (2012).
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While we agree with the idea that peoples’ mode of reasoning may sometimes
undergo a shift from individualistic to reasoning as members of a team, we
criticize the identification of the team’s interests with the maximization of the
average of individuals’ personal payoffs. We do this for two reasons. First, it
relies on making interpersonal comparisons of individual players’ payoffs, which
goes beyond the standard assumptions of the expected utility theory. Second,
it may advocate a complete self-sacrifice of some individuals for the benefit
of others or possibly one sole member of a team. In this paper we present
an alternative function for representing team’s interests that does not rely on
making interpersonal comparisons of payoffs and makes participation in team
play conditional on it bringing about at least some benefit to every member of
the team.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we discuss
the theory of team reasoning in more detail and present how it is sometimes
operationalized to render Hi to be the only rational choice in the Hi-Lo game
and explain cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Stag Hunt games.
We also explain that the notion of team reasoning cannot be represented by a
transformation of individuals’ personal payoffs in games. In section 3 we discuss
why the maximization of the average of individuals’ personal payoffs may not be
a good representation of team’s interests. In section 4 we present an alternative
rank-based function and illustrate its predictions using a variety of examples4.
With section 5 we conclude and suggest a few possible directions for further
research.
2 Team Reasoning
When a person reasons individualistically, he or she focuses on the question
“what it is that I should do in order to best promote my interests?”. The
answer to this question identifies a strategy that is associated with the highest
expected personal payoff to the individual , given his or her beliefs about the
actions of others. This is what is meant by individualistic best-response reason-
ing underlying the identification of Nash equilibria in games. When a person
reasons as a member of a team, on the other hand, he or she focuses on the
question “what it is that we should do in order to best promote our interests?”.
The answer to this question identifies a set of strategies — one for each of the
interacting individuals5 — that leads to the attainment of the best possible out-
come for the group of individuals acting together as a team. As explained by
Gold and Sugden (2007a) ‘when an individual reasons as a member of a team,
4By function we mean what the rational choice theory refers to as a choice function that
takes the set of the available actions to an individual, the structure of a game and the indi-
vidual’s beliefs about others’ behaviour as inputs and produces a set of (rational) actions as
an output.
5Strictly speaking this need not necessarily be the case, since not all individuals in a given
strategic interaction may be reasoning as members of a team. There are variants of the theory
of team reasoning that consider such scenarios. For an overview see Gold and Sugden (2007a).
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she considers which combination of actions by members of the team would best
promote the team’s objective, and then performs her part of that combination’.
Among the existing literature on the theory of team reasoning that attempts
to propose an explicit function for representing the interests of a team a reference
is sometimes made to the maximization of the average of individuals’ personal
payoffs. This suggestion can be found in Bacharach (1999, 2006) and, in later
theoretical developments, it was made by Smerilli (2012). In empirical studies
it was adopted by Colman et al. (2008, 2014). It is not the case that everybody
operationalizes the theory of team reasoning using this function. Sugden (1993,
2000, 2003) as well as Gold and Sugden (2007a,b) do not endorse any explicit
function as a possible candidate and Gold (2012) suggests that team’s interests
do not have to be represented by the maximization of the average of individuals’
personal payoffs. Crawford et al. (2008) and Bardsley et al. (2010) provide
an interpretation of team reasoning as a search for a decision rule that would
resolve certain types of coordination problems in a mutually beneficial way, but
do not propose a specific function as well. Sugden (2011, 2015) suggests that a
function representing team’s interests should incorporate the notion of mutual
advantage among all members of a team. We will adopt the latter idea in our
construction of the rank-based function of team’s interests in section 4 below.
However, from the literature on the theory of team reasoning that is known to
us, it either makes a reference to the maximization of average payoffs or does not
endorse any specific function explicitly and instead focuses on a number of more
general properties for such a function to satisfy (e.g. successful coordination of
individuals’ actions or the notion of mutual benefit among the members of a
team).
One reason why the maximization of the average of individuals’ payoffs is
attractive is that it ensures Pareto efficiency of any outcome that is selected by
a team6. It is easy to see that the outcome that best promotes this objective in
the Hi-Lo game is (Hi , Hi). Thus, when an individual reasons as a member of
a team, he or she identifies (Hi , Hi) as the uniquely optimal outcome for the
team and individually chooses Hi — his or her part in the attainment of this
outcome.
Consider now the Prisoner’s Dilemma game illustrated in Figure 2A, in which
two players independently and simultaneously decide whether to cooperate (play
C ) or defect (play D). This game has a unique Nash equilibrium: (D , D). This
is because, irrespective of what the other player is going to do, it is always
better to play D from an individual’s personal point of view. Individualistic
reasoning thus leads to a socially suboptimal, Pareto inefficient outcome, since
the outcome (D , D) yields lower payoffs to both players than does the outcome
(C , C ). This is the main reason why this game is so widely discussed in social
sciences.
Experimental results suggest that in a one-shot version of the Prisoner’s
6An outcome is Pareto efficient if there exists no other outcome in which somebody’s payoff
could be increased without making anyone else worse off. In the Hi-Lo game the outcome (Lo,
Lo) is Pareto inefficient since both players are better off in the outcome (Hi , Hi) which is the
only Pareto efficient outcome in this game.
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C D
C 2, 2 0, 3
D 3, 0 1, 1
A
S H
S 2, 2 0, 1
H 1, 0 1, 1
B
Figure 2: The Prisoner’s Dilemma (A) and the Stag Hunt (B) games
Dilemma game (i.e. when it is played only once) people tend to cooperate about
50% of the time7. Notice that the outcome (C , C ) uniquely maximizes the
average of individuals’ personal payoffs. As such, the theory of team reasoning
operationalized as above suggests that in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game some
people may be reasoning as members of a team while others reason individual-
istically.
In a similar way the theory can explain cooperation in the Stag Hunt game
illustrated in Figure 2B. This game has two Nash equilibria: (S ,S ) and (H ,H ).
However, hunting hare (playing H ) guarantees a payoff of 1 irrespective of what
the other player does, whereas the attainment of the high payoff from hunting
stag (playing S ) crucially depends on the cooperation of the other party. Here
experimental results suggest that in a one-shot version of this game people tend
to choose S slightly more than 60% of the time8. We will return to discussing
this result in more detail in Section 4 below.
Team Reasoning vs. Transformation of Personal Payoffs
An important point stressed by many decision and game theorists is that the
payoff structures of games have to fully capture everything that is motivationally
important in individuals’ evaluations of the possible outcomes of those games.
For example, imagine that two people are playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game
in terms of monetary payoffs as illustrated in Figure 3A. Suppose that the row
player is a pure altruist when it comes to decisions involving money — i.e. he or
she always wants to maximize the other player’s monetary gain. Suppose also
that the column player always prefers to maximize his or her personal monetary
payoff, but is extremely averse to inequitable distributions of gains among indi-
viduals. For simplicity assume that an outcome resulting in unequal monetary
7However, cooperation tends to decrease with repetition (i.e. when the same game is played
a number of times). See Ledyard (1995) for a survey of experimental results from public goods
games, which involve more than two players but otherwise are very similar in their structure
to the two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma.
8The proportion of people choosing S changes with repetition: in some cases it increases
while in others it decreases. This seems to (at least partially) depend on the specific payoff
structure of the played Stag Hunt game — the extent of risk involved in playing S and the
extent of risklessness in playing H . See Battalio et al. (2001).
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gains for the two players is just as good for him or her as gaining nothing. The
correct representation of the true motivations of these individuals transforms the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game in terms of monetary payoffs into the game illustrated
in Figure 3B. This transformed game has a unique Nash equilibrium (C ,C ) in
which both players rationally cooperate following individualistic best-response
reasoning in the attainment of their personal goals.
C D
C £2, £2 £0, £3
D £3, £0 £1, £1
A
C D
C 2, 2 3, 0
D 0, 0 1, 1
B
Figure 3: The Prisoner’s Dilemma game in terms of £ (A) and its transformation
using payoffs that represent the true motivations of both players (B)
We agree with the idea that the payoff structures of games have to accu-
rately capture the true motivations of interacting individuals. However, it is
important to note that a possible shift in a decision-maker’s mode of reasoning
from individualistic to reasoning as a member of a team cannot be captured
by a transformation of that individual’s personal payoffs in the same way as
it was done in the case of altruism and inequity-aversion above. To see this
consider again the Hi-Lo game illustrated in Figure 1. Suppose that the row
player reasons as a member of a team and adopts the maximization of the av-
erage of individuals’ personal payoffs as the team’s objective. Replacing his or
her personal payoff numbers with averages of the two players’ payoffs in each
outcome does not transform the original Hi-Lo game into anything different.
This is because the personal payoffs of the two players already match the av-
erage of their personal payoffs in each outcome of this game to begin with. As
a result, the transformed game would still have two Nash equilibria and two
rational outcomes — exactly what the theory of team reasoning was developed
to contest.
The difference between an individualistic mode of reasoning and reasoning as
a member of a team lies not in how an individual personally values each outcome
of a game, but in the way he or she reasons when choosing among the available
actions. When a person reasons individualistically, he or she chooses an action
based on his or her belief about what the other player is going to do and what
outcome — and personal payoff — the chosen action would subsequently yield.
When a person reasons as a member of a team, on the other hand, he or she
first identifies an outcome of the game that best fulfills the team’s objective and
then performs his or her part in the attainment of that outcome. In other words,
somebody who reasons individualistically chooses an action that maximizes his
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or her expected personal payoff, whereas somebody who reasons as a member
of a team chooses an action that is associated with an outcome that best fulfills
the team’s objective.
This underlines two key assumptions on which our approach is based. First,
we assume that individuals’ personal payoffs represent their true motivations in
games. In addition to this we assume that the payoff structures of games are
commonly known by all the interacting decision-makers when they reason about
what courses of action to take. The latter point rules out the possibility that a
mere shift in an individual’s mode of reasoning — in addition to changing the
way that individual reasons — changes the way he or she personally values each
outcome in the considered games. If that were not the case, these interactions
would cease to be games of complete information about each other’s payoffs
and would take us further away from the orthodox game theory and the type of
games we analyze in this paper.
Another important point to note is that reasoning as a member of a team
does not imply and is not implied by the sharing of the attained payoffs among
the members of a team. In other words, the attained payoffs are not transferable
from one player to another. If players are able to (or indeed are going to) share
their personal gains, this has to be reflected in the payoff structures of the played
games to start with in order to capture the players’ true motivations. In this
light, equal sharing of combined payoffs in the Hi-Lo game would leave the payoff
structure of the original game unchanged. It would, however, change the payoff
structure of any game that contained outcomes yielding unequal distributions
of payoffs among players (as is the case, for example, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
and the Stag Hunt games).
Team Reasoning and the Team’s Interests: Two Separate
Questions
The theory of team reasoning, as introduced above, has to answer two separate
but equally important questions. First, it needs to specify clear and testable
circumstances under which individuals’ mode of reasoning may undergo a shift
from individualistic to reasoning as members of a team. Second, in cases when
individuals do reason as members of a team, it needs to specify what they take
the team’s interests to be upon deciding on what courses of action to take. In
this paper we predominantly focus on the latter question and turn to it next.
3 Team’s Interests: Not the Average of Per-
sonal Payoffs
As mentioned above, among the works on the theory of team reasoning to date
that attempt to propose an explicit function for representing the interests of
a team a reference is sometimes made to the maximization of the average of
individual decision-makers’ personal payoffs. We criticize this suggestion and
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believe that, if people do reason as members of a team in certain situations,
they are unlikely to adopt the maximization of average payoffs as a guide when
thinking about what it is that they should do. Our criticism is based on two
points.
First, the maximization of the average of personal payoffs may, in certain
situations, advocate a complete sacrifice of some individuals’ personal interests
for the benefit of others or possibly one sole member of a team — a consequence
which we find intuitively problematic. To see this, consider a slightly amended
version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game illustrated in Figure 4A. The only dif-
ference from its original version is the slightly higher payoff to the row player
from defection when the column player cooperates. In this game, the maxi-
mization of the average of players’ personal payoffs would identify the team’s
objective with the attainment of the outcome (D ,C ). It would thus prescribe a
complete sacrifice of the column player’s personal interests with the row player
reaping all the benefits from team play.
C D
C 2, 2 0, 3
D 5, 0 1, 1
A
L R
U 10, 1 0, 0
D 4, 4 1, 9
B
Figure 4: The amended Prisoner’s Dilemma (A) and the Chicken (B) games
For a slightly different example consider the game illustrated in Figure 4B,
which is a particular version of the game known as the Chicken. This game has
two Nash equilibria: (U ,L) and (D ,R). Here the maximization of average payoffs
suggests that team’s interests would be best fulfilled with the attainment of the
outcome (U ,L). In this case it does not prescribe a complete self-sacrifice to the
column player — the outcome (U ,L) is not the worst possible outcome for him
or her in this game — but it does not advance the column player’s personal
interests anywhere far from just that.
Our suggestion is that, if some people’s mode of reasoning does undergo a
shift from individualistic to reasoning as members of a team in the amended
Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Chicken games, the team’s objective would be the
attainment of the outcomes (C ,C ) and (D ,L) respectively. More importantly,
we suggest that no individual would willingly subscribe to team play if there was
no personal gain for him or her from doing so, which precludes the possibility
of a self-sacrifice. Our intuition is shared by Sugden (2011) who suggests that
a team’s goal should be, in one way or another, beneficial to every member of
the team.
This is not to say that self-sacrifice does not exist. It is evident that we
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are often willing to sacrifice our personal material gains for the well-being of
our loved ones. However, we suggest that such motivational factors need to
be fully captured by individuals’ personal payoffs associated with the possible
outcomes in games before the different modes of reasoning are considered. And
if team reasoning is a mode of reasoning that individual decision-makers may
adopt in one-shot interactions with potentially complete strangers — cases that
we consider in this paper — self-sacrifice of individuals is unlikely.
The essence of this argument rests on an idea somewhat similar to the no-
tion of the separateness of persons used to criticize utilitarianism. Utilitarian-
ism, which focuses on the maximization of the aggregate well-being of a society
while ignoring the distribution of the attained well-being among the individual
members of that society, is said to be insufficiently sensitive to the separateness
of individuals and the advancement of their personal well-being. In a similar
fashion it can be argued that any aggregative function of team’s interests that
fails to take into account the distribution of payoffs among the members of a
team is susceptible to being rejected for failing to respect the separateness of
interacting players. So long as there is space to make an objection on such
grounds, any individual decision-maker could reasonably protest against taking
part in the prescribed team play when their personal gains from doing so are
insufficiently addressed9.
An important implication of the first point of our criticism is that we remain
committed to the idea that all that matters for individual decision-makers are
their personal motivations in the considered games. In this sense, the use of
the term “team” in the interpretation of the theory of team reasoning in this
paper is meant to be very loose. Most importantly, it is not meant to carry
any psychological connotations that may be present in various other interpre-
tations of team work and team members’ duties (e.g. in sport, work groups,
neighbourhoods, faculties, etc.) which may lead to individuals’ abandonment
of their personal aspirations (even when these aspirations take into account
the well-being of others). In certain types of interpersonal interactions, how-
ever, the decision-makers’ personal interests may be advanced further relative
to where they would end up at if everyone followed individualistic best-response
reasoning. This advancement of personal interests is made possible — as we
will attempt to show in the next section — by a shift in the decision-makers’
mode of reasoning from individualistic to reasoning as members of a team.
The second point of our criticism is based on the fact that the use of the
average function relies on making interpersonal comparisons of the interacting
individuals’ payoffs. However, the standard assumptions of the expected utility
theory that make numerical representations of individuals’ motivations possi-
ble by themselves do not allow such comparisons to be made10. To illustrate
what this means, consider again the Prisoner’s Dilemma game presented in
9See Rawls (1971) and Nozick (1974) for criticism of utilitarianism. Although we use an
analogy to their notion of the separateness of persons, our claim here is not based on grounds
of moral normativity.
10In the literature on the theory of team reasoning this has also been pointed out by Sugden
(2000).
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Figures 2(A) and 3(A). The numerical representation of the row player’s prefer-
ences allows us to say that he or she prefers the outcome (C ,C ) to the outcome
(D ,D). It also allows us to say that he or she prefers the outcome (C ,C ) to the
outcome (C ,D) by a greater extent than he or she prefers the outcome (D ,C ) to
the outcome (C ,C ). However, it does not allow us to claim that the row player
“enjoys” the benefits of the outcome (C ,C ) by as much as does the column
player.
Although in this paper we do not discuss the technical arguments of why it
is so, any payoff function that numerically represents a decision-maker’s pref-
erences or motivations is unique only up to positive affine transformations11.
What follows from this is that the payoff structure of the game illustrated in
Figure 5(B) represents exactly the same motivations of the interacting individ-
uals as the one in Figure 5(A)12.
C D
C 2, 2 0, 3
D 3, 0 1, 1
A
C D
C 6, 3 0, 4
D 9, 1 3, 2
B
Figure 5: The original Prisoner’s Dilemma game (A) and its representation
using positive affine transformations of the row and the column players’ payoffs
(B)
If the theory of team reasoning makes use of an aggregative payoff function
to represent the interests of a team — such as the maximization of the average
or the sum of individuals’ personal payoffs — it ceases to be a mere extension
of the framework used by the standard rational choice theory and needs to
suggest how the required interpersonal comparisons of payoffs are possible. An
alternative is to drop the idea that team’s goals are best represented by such
aggregative functions and in the next section we propose a representation of
team’s interests based on the latter approach. To put this point differently,
we hope to show that team play is possible in certain types of interpersonal
interactions even without invoking interpersonal comparisons of the interacting
players’ payoffs.
11This means that if u is a payoff function representing an individual’s personal motivations,
then so is function u′ = au + c where a > 0 and c are constants. For a detailed discussion of
why this is so see, for example, Luce and Raiffa (1957, ch. 2).
12The column player’s payoffs in Figure 5(B) were transformed by adding 1 to every number
representing his or her payoffs in the original representation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game
in Figure 5(A) while the row player’s payoffs were transformed by multiplying each number
by a factor of 3.
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4 Team’s Interests: A Rank-Based Function
In this section we propose an alternative representation of team’s interests that
fits better with our intuition about a number of conditions that need to be
satisfied in order for individual decision-makers to take part in team play. We
start with the proposition of two properties for a candidate function of team’s
interests to have:
1. A team’s objective has to be the attainment of an outcome that is bene-
ficial to every member of the team.
2. Decision-makers’ payoffs are not interpersonally comparable, but each in-
dividual’s preferential ranking of the possible outcomes of a game is com-
monly known by all players. The derivation of a team’s objective should
be done without invoking interpersonal comparisons of players’ payoffs.
The first property captures the idea that there has to be something “in it”
for a potential member of a team from team play in order for that individual
to agree to participate in the attainment of the team’s goal. As mentioned
earlier, we share the intuition behind this property with Sugden (2011) who
suggests that team play has to be recognized as being mutually advantageous
by all those partaking in it. Of course, we will need to define what it means for
something to be regarded as mutually advantageous as well as how and relative
to what that advantage is measured. The second property is a corollary of the
standard assumption of game theory for games of complete information about
the interacting players’ payoffs. It is also in line with the standard axioms of
rationality that make numerical representations of decision-makers’ preferences
possible but do not automatically grant their interpersonal comparability.
With these properties in mind, we suggest a team’s objective to be the
maximal advancement of mutual benefit to the members of the team. There are
two ways to motivate our proposed function of team’s interests. One is axiomatic
and is based on presenting a set of more fine-grained properties for a function of
team’s interests to satisfy. The other describes a plausible reasoning process that
we believe rational decision-makers may often engage in when facing particular
types of games. We start with the axiomatic approach first by proposing three
axioms to characterize the interests of a team.
Axiom 1 (Weak Pareto optimality): If an outcome x of a game is strictly
preferentially dominated by some other outcome y for all players, then the out-
come x is not chosen by the team.
This axiom ensures Pareto efficiency of the selected outcome in a weak sense13.
We believe this to be an essential feature of any candidate function for repre-
senting team’s interests. Since team-reasoning individuals evaluate all outcomes
13An outcome is Pareto efficient in a weak sense if there exists no other outcome in which
every player is better off in terms of their personal payoffs. The set of Pareto efficient outcomes
in a weak sense is a subset of all Pareto efficient outcomes, since the latter requires there to
be no other outcome in which somebody’s payoff could be increased without making anyone
else worse off.
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of a game and identify the attainment of a subset of these as an objective for
a team, it would be odd if they picked an outcome that, from every player’s
personal point of view, was worse than some other available alternative14.
Before presenting the second axiom we need to introduce a few additional
terms. Let the smallest personal payoff that a player can attain from choosing
a particular strategy in a game be called that player’s personal security payoff
associated with the strategy in question. Recall the Stag Hunt game illustrated
in Figure 2(B). The personal security payoff associated with hunting stag for
either player is 0, since it is the minimal personal payoff that can be attained by
playing S. Similarly, the personal security payoff associated with hunting hare
(playing H) for either player is 1. Given this and and any game, a player can
always choose to play a strategy that is associated with the highest personal
security payoff. This, in turn, guarantees the player the attainment of a payoff
that is at least as high as the security payoff in question, irrespective of what the
other players are going to do. In the case of the Stag Hunt game, the maximal
payoff that any player can guarantee him or her self in this way is 1, which
is the personal security payoff associated with hunting hare. This is usually
referred to as the player’s personal maximin payoff level in the game and the
corresponding strategy — the maximin strategy.
Axiom 2 (Preservation of personal security): Team play cannot leave any
player worse-off than his or her personal maximin payoff level in a game.
This axiom limits a team’s objective to the attainment of only those outcomes
that result in players’ personal payoffs being at least as good as the payoffs that
they could secure themselves by playing their maximin strategies individually.
As such, it defines the lower threshold points in games, below which potential
members of a team would, so to speak, not “agree to go” in team play, since
they can guarantee themselves a better personal payoff individually15.
We now turn to defining individual and mutual advantage and the way these
are measured. To do this we introduce the following method for assigning pref-
erential rank values to the available outcomes in games based on each player’s
personal preferential ordering of those outcomes. For a particular player, the
least preferred outcome in a game is assigned the preferential rank value 0. The
second least preferred outcome is assigned the preferential rank value 1 and
so on. A shift from one outcome to another that results in an increase of the
assigned preferential rank value by 1 for some player is said to advance that
player’s personal interests by 1 unit.
Individual advantage: An outcome of a game is individually advantageous to
a particular player if that player preferentially ranks this outcome above
the outcome(s) associated with his or her personal maximin payoff level in
the game. The extent of individual advantage provided by an outcome to
14Bardsley et al. (2010) consider possible cases where the Pareto criterion may be abandoned
in team play. We will briefly return to this in more detail in Section 5 below.
15In a recent article Sugden (2015) uses the same lower threshold point in defining mutually
advantageous team play.
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a particular player is given by the number of units this outcome advances
that player’s personal interests relative to the outcome(s) associated with
his or her personal maximin payoff level in the game.
Mutual advantage: An outcome of a game is mutually advantageous to the
interacting players if each player preferentially ranks this outcome above
the outcome(s) associated with his or her personal maximin payoff level
in the game. The extent of mutual advantage provided by an outcome
to the interacting decision-makers is given by the number of units this
outcome advances all players’ personal interests in parallel relative to the
outcome(s) associated with each player’s personal maximin payoff level in
the game.
For an example imagine a two-player game where some outcome x advances
the first and the second player’s personal interests relative to the outcomes
associated with their personal maximin payoff levels in the game by 1 and
2 units respectively. Since this outcome advances the two players’ personal
interests in parallel by 1 unit, it is said to provide 1 unit of mutual advantage
to the interacting decision-makers. The additional unit of advancement of the
second player’s personal interests provided by this outcome represents individual
advantage to the second player over and above the 1 unit of mutual advantage.
We will illustrate this with a number of more concrete examples later in this
section.
Axiom 3 (Maximal mutual advantage): An outcome selected by a team
has to be maximally mutually advantageous.
This axiom has two implications. First, if a game contains a mutually ad-
vantageous outcome, then any outcome that is selected by a team must also
be mutually advantageous. Second, if a game contains multiple mutually ad-
vantageous outcomes, then the outcome(s) selected by the team must provide
maximal mutual advantage. In other words, if there is an outcome that provides
more mutual benefit to the interacting decision-makers than some outcome x,
then x is not chosen by the team.
Given the three axioms above we propose the following function to represent
the interests of a team.
Rank-based function of team’s interests: Maximize the minimum number
of units by which an outcome advances individuals’ personal interests
among the interacting players relative to each player’s threshold point
— the outcome(s) associated with his or her maximin payoff level in the
game.
It can be shown that this function satisfies the three axioms introduced earlier
(for proofs see Appendix). It is not, however, the only function that does so. For
an example consider a two-player game where a particular outcome x advances
each of the two players’ personal interests by 2 units while some other outcome
y advances the first and the second player’s personal interests by 2 and 3 units
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respectively. The extent of mutual advantage provided by either of the two
outcomes is the same — 2 units. Assuming there to be no outcomes providing
a higher extent of mutual advantage in this game, the rank-based function of
team’s interests selects both x and y. As such, any function that would fur-
ther discriminate between these two outcomes would also satisfy the introduced
axioms. We believe, however, that the proposed function captures best the in-
teracting individuals’ primary motivation to satisfy their personal preferences
in a mutually beneficial way without invoking additional motivational attitudes
such as benevolence towards others in team play.
The second way to motivate the proposed function is to describe a plausi-
ble reasoning process that rational decision-makers may undergo when facing
particular types of games that is in line with its predictions. We will do this
by discussing a number of examples below. Before that we present a formal
representation of the function just described.
Formalization
Let Γ be a normal form game defined as a triple (I, Si, ui) where I = {1, 2, . . . ,m}
is a finite set of m players, Si is a set of pure strategies available to player i ∈ I,
and ui(s) is a payoff function that assigns to every player i ∈ I a personal payoff
for each outcome in the game. An outcome of a game is defined as a strategy
profile s = (s1, . . . , sm) where si ∈ Si is a particular pure strategy chosen by
player i ∈ I. Let Σ be the set of all possible strategy profiles (i.e. outcomes) in
the game Γ and sYi ∈ Σ be a strategy profile that is associated with player i’s
maximin payoff level in the game.
Each player i ∈ I has a personal preferential ranking of all the strategy
profiles in the set Σ. Let Z0...k be a set of non-negative integers from 0 to k
where k ≤ n − 1 and n is the total number of strategy profiles available in the
game Γ . Let ℘i : Σ → Z0...k be a ranking function that, for each player i ∈ I,
assigns a personal preferential rank value to each strategy profile in the set Σ
as follows: the strategy profile that player i ∈ I prefers the least in the game
Γ is assigned the preferential rank value 0, the second least preferred strategy
profile is assigned the preferential rank value 1 and so on.
The rank-based function of team’s interests Fτ : Σ → Στ , where Στ ⊆ Σ,
is a choice function that selects a subset from the set of all possible strategy
profiles of the game Γ such that each selected strategy profile maximizes the
minimum difference, across all players, between the preferential rank value of the
selected profile and the preferential rank value of the strategy profile associated
with a particular player’s personal maximin payoff level in the game. In other
words, each element sτ ∈ Στ is such that sτ = max
s∈Σ
{min
i∈I
[
℘i(s)− ℘i(sYi)
]}.
Examples
We now turn to discussing a number of examples. First, we apply the function
of team’s interests to four well known two-player games with multiple Nash
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equilibria. We then turn to discussing the implications of the proposed function
in two games with unique Nash equilibria.
The Hi-Lo
Recall the Hi-Lo game illustrated in Figure 1. The row and the column play-
ers’ personal preferential rankings of the four outcomes are shown below with
numbers representing the corresponding preferential rank values and arrows in-
dicating outcomes associated with each player’s maximin payoff levels in the
game.
Row player:
 (Hi,Hi) 2(Lo, Lo) 1
⇒ (Hi, Lo)(Lo,Hi) 0
 Column player:
 (Hi,Hi) 2(Lo, Lo) 1
⇒ (Hi, Lo)(Lo,Hi) 0

Relative to the maximin payoff level, the outcome (Hi , Hi) advances each
player’s personal interests by 2 units. The outcome (Lo, Lo) does so by 1 unit.
Hence, the rank-based function of team’s interests identifies (Hi , Hi) as the best
outcome for a team and its attainment as the team’s objective. As a result, for
any individual who reasons as a member of a team, (Hi , Hi) is the only rational
outcome in this game.
A plausible reasoning process by which individual players may arrive at this
conclusion can be described as follows. Having worked out all the best-response
strategies in this game, individualistically reasoning decision-makers face a Nash
equilibrium selection problem. This leaves them stuck with no further indication
of what actions they ought to perform independently from each other in order
to best promote their personal interests. The next question they ask themselves
is “what would be best for both of us in this situation?”. As soon as they do so,
they start reasoning as members of a team and identify the uniquely rational
outcome from the perspective of team’s interests.
According to the deliberative process just described, the adoption of the
team mode of reasoning comes about as a result of extensive thinking about
games by otherwise individualistically rational agents who are able to work out
each other’s best-response strategies and realize that these leave them with a
Nash equilibrium selection problem. As such, it uses as its starting point the
standard assumption of the orthodox game theory that the basic mode of the
interacting decision-makers’ mode of reasoning is individualistic best-response
reasoning16.
The Stag Hunt
Recall the Stag Hunt game illustrated in Figure 2(B). The row and the column
players’ preferential rankings of outcomes are shown below.
16For other possible suggestions of what may trigger shifts in individuals’ mode of reasoning,
some of which abandon this assumption, see, for example, Bacharach (2006), Sugden (2003)
or Gold and Sugden (2007a,b).
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Row player:
 (S, S) 2⇒ (H,S)(H,H) 1
(S,H) 0
 Column player:
 (S, S) 2⇒ (S,H)(H,H) 1
(H,S) 0

Since either player can obtain a payoff of 1 by hunting hare (playing H ) ir-
respective of what the other player is going to do, the personal maximin payoff
level is associated with the pair of outcomes (H , S ) and (H , H ) for the row,
and (S , H ) and (H , H ) for the column players. Since (S , S ) is the only mu-
tually advantageous outcome relative to these threshold points, the rank-based
function of team’s interests identifies it as the uniquely rational solution of the
game for players who reason as members of a team.
With regards to this game in particular, however, it is important to men-
tion other solution concepts to the Nash equilibrium selection problem that
are based on risk or uncertainty aversion with respect to choosing a particular
action. Notice that in the Stag Hunt game it can be argued that the Nash
equilibrium (H , H ) is in some sense safer than the equilibrium (S , S ). This is
because either player is guaranteed a certain payoff from hunting hare (playing
H ) whereas the high payoff from hunting stag (playing S ) crucially depends on
the other player’s choice. While we don’t review the various models of risk and
uncertainty aversion in this paper (some of which are based on probabilistic
assessments of players’ actions while others on the sizes of foregone payoffs in
cases of deviations from equilibrium play) we do believe that these considera-
tions may play a role in determining the likelihood of individuals’ adoption of
the team mode of reasoning. However, since existing experimental data suggests
that in one-shot interactions people tend to play S slightly more than 60% of
the time, we do suggest that a shift in individuals’ mode of reasoning to that as
members of a team in one-shot versions of this game is likely17.
The Chicken
Recall the Chicken game illustrated in Figure 4(B). The row and the column
players’ preferential rankings of outcomes are shown below.
Row player:

(U,L) 3
(D,L) 2
⇒ (D,R) 1
(U,R) 0
 Column player:

(D,R) 3
(D,L) 2
⇒ (U,L) 1
(U,R) 0

Here, similarly as in the Stag Hunt game above, (D , L) is the only mutually
advantageous outcome relative to the two players’ threshold points — their
personal maximin payoff levels in the game. As such, the rank-based function
of team’s interests identifies its attainment as the objective for the team.
The deliberative process by which individual decision-makers may arrive
at this conclusion is described as follows. Thinking individualistically, both
17Rankin et al. (2000) report an experiment in which different versions of the Stag Hunt
game are played repeatedly, but in a way that aims to induce one-shot reasoning of partici-
pating individuals in each round (by changing labels associated with the available actions and
varying sizes of payoffs resulting from different outcomes each time the game is played). In
this setting virtually everyone switches to playing S over time, which seems to support our
suggestion.
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players identify the two Nash equilibria in this game: (U , L) and (D , R). From
a personal point of view, the row player prefers the attainment of the outcome
(U , L). At the same time he or she recognizes the column player’s preference
for the attainment of the outcome (D , R). If both players were to pursue their
preferred options, they would end up with the outcome (U , R), which is the
worst of all possible outcomes for both. The Nash equilibrium selection problem,
as previously, leaves them stuck with no further indication of what actions they
ought to perform independently from each other in order to best promote their
personal interests. At this stage they ask themselves “what would be best for
both of us in this situation?”. As soon as they do so, they identify the outcome
(D , L) as the uniquely rational solution of this game from the perspective of
team’s interests. Now, since the outcome (D , L) is not a Nash equilibrium
itself, they may each consider unilateral deviation from team play. However,
the previously recognized conflict of their personal interests associated with the
two Nash equilibria prevents them from doing so, emphasizing the outcome (D ,
L) as the only mutually advantageous solution of the game.
The Dividing of a Cake
Another interesting case involving multiple Nash equilibria is the Dividing of a
Cake game illustrated in Figure 6, which is a particularly simple version of the
well known Nash Bargaining game. In this game two players are presented
0 1 2 3 4
0 0, 0 0, 1 0, 2 0, 3 0, 4
1 1, 0 1, 1 1, 2 1, 3 0, 0
2 2, 0 2, 1 2, 2 0, 0 0, 0
3 3, 0 3, 1 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
4 4, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
Figure 6: The Dividing of a Cake game
with a cake that is cut into four equal-sized pieces and simultaneously place a
demand for the number of pieces for themselves (from 0 to 4 ). If the sum of
their demanded pieces does not exceed 4 , they both get what they asked for.
If, on the other hand, the sum exceeds 4 , they both get nothing. The game has
six Nash equilibria: (4 , 0 ), (3 , 1 ), (2 , 2 ), (1 , 3 ), (0 , 4 ) and an inefficient (4 ,
4 ). The row and the column players’ personal rankings of outcomes are shown
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below18.
Row player:

(4 , 0 ) 4
(3 , 0 )(3 , 1 ) 3
(2 , 0 )(2 , 1 )(2 , 2 ) 2
(1 , 0 )(1 , 1 )(1 , 2 )(1 , 3 ) 1
⇒ (0 , 0 )(0 , 1 )(0 , 2 )(0 , 3 )(0 , 4 ) 0

Column player:

(0 , 4 ) 4
(0 , 3 )(1 , 3 ) 3
(0 , 2 )(1 , 2 )(2 , 2 ) 2
(0 , 1 )(1 , 1 )(2 , 1 )(3 , 1 ) 1
⇒ (0 , 0 )(1 , 0 )(2 , 0 )(3 , 0 )(4 , 0 ) 0

Here, relative to the two individuals’ maximin payoff levels, the outcome
(2 , 2 ) advances each player’s personal interests by 2 units. Since every other
outcome either advances one of the players’ personal interests by only 1 unit or
is not mutually advantageous (i.e. does not advance one of the players’ personal
interests at all) the rank-based function of team’s interests identifies the team’s
objective with the attainment of the outcome (2 , 2 ). This usually appeals to
most decision-makers and is supported by experimental results19.
The above result is in line with Nash’s bargaining solution of this game20. In
a recent paper Misyak and Chater (2014) propose a theory of virtual bargaining
as an alternative mode of reasoning that individuals may adopt when choosing
among the available outcomes and courses of actions in various types of games.
According to the proposed model the interacting decision-makers are said to
be undergoing implicit mental bargaining processes in an attempt to work out
possible agreeable outcomes in a somewhat similar fashion as it is done with
the rank-based function of team’s interests presented here. There are, however,
some differences between the two approaches.
First, the existing theories of bargaining generally rely on the existence of a
unique reference outcome that obtains when individuals fail to reach an agree-
ment following a bargaining process. In the Dividing of a Cake game this is
assumed to be the outcome in which both players gain nothing. In the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma game this is usually the Nash equilibrium (D , D) — the outcome
that both players can fall back to in case of a failure of reaching an agreement
with regards to anything else. In most other cases that we address in this paper,
however, there is no such unique reference point. This does not pose a problem
for the proposed rank-based function of team’s interests, since its outputs are
determined not in relation to a unique reference outcome but by considering
multiple threshold points — one for each player in a game.
18There are 11 outcomes in total that yield a payoff of 0 to both players. For the sake of
brevity they are all represented by the outcome (0 , 0 ) in the two rankings.
19See Nydegger and Owen (1974) for an experiment in which two players are asked to divide
$1 among themselves and virtually everybody agrees on a 50%-50% split.
20The fact that the predicted outcomes are the same in this particular example is a co-
incidence and the proposed rank-based function of team’s interests is more in line with the
bargaining solution presented by Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975). Although the differences
and implications of the two bargaining models are interesting, we do not discuss them in more
detail here. For a discussion of Nash’s bargaining model see, for example, Luce and Raiffa
(1957, ch. 6).
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The second difference lies with the fact that Nash’s bargaining model (which
is presented as a possible starting point in the development of the theory of
virtual bargaining) does not entirely avoid the need to make some interpersonal
comparisons of individuals’ payoffs. This is because Nash’s solution requires the
interacting decision-makers’ payoff functions to be unique only up to positive
linear transformations and not positive affine transformations as we assume here.
This difference, however, can be overcome by adopting a different bargaining
model, such as the one presented by Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975)21.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma and the PD-SH Hybrid
Recall the original and the amended Prisoner’s Dilemma games illustrated in
Figures 2(A) and 4(A) respectively. The row and the column players’ preferen-
tial rankings of the four outcomes and their personal maximin threshold points
(which are the same in both games) are shown below.
Row player:

(D,C) 3
(C,C) 2
⇒ (D,D) 1
(C,D) 0
 Column player:

(C,D) 3
(C,C) 2
⇒ (D,D) 1
(D,C) 0

The outcomes (C , D) and (D , C ) lie below one or the other player’s threshold
point. Hence their attainment is not viable in team play. Since (C , C ) is the
only outcome that advances both players’ personal interests relative to their
personal maximin payoff levels, it is identified as the unique solution of the
game from the perspective of team’s interests.
For a slightly different example consider a game in which the row player’s
payoffs are exactly the same as those in the Prisoner’s Dilemma but the column
player’s — as in the Stag Hunt games. We call this the PD-SH Hybrid game
and it is illustrated in Figure 722.
S H
C 2, 2 0, 1
D 3, 0 1, 1
Figure 7: The PD-SH Hybrid game
21The underlying mechanism of the rank-based function of team’s interests is somewhat
similar to that behind the egalitarian solution to bargaining problems presented by Kalai
(1977) and Myerson (1977). The egalitarian solution is in line with the maximization of
the minimum advancement of players’ personal payoffs relative to a given reference point.
However, since it is concerned with equal advancement of players’ payoffs, the model is also
reliant on the interpersonal comparability of those payoffs.
22In an unpublished manuscript Kavka (1989) calls this game the Assurance Dilemma, in
which he analyzes it from the perspective of individualistic best-response reasoning.
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This game has a unique Nash equilibrium: (D , H ). The row and the column
players’ preferential rankings of outcomes are shown below.
Row player:

(D,S) 3
(C, S) 2
⇒ (D,H) 1
(C,H) 0
 Column player:
 (C, S) 2⇒ (C,H)(D,H) 1
(D,S) 0

Similarly as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the outcomes (C , H ) and (D , S ) are
not viable options in team play, since they lie below one or the other player’s
maximin threshold points. The rank-based function of team’s interests selects
(C , S ) — the only mutually advantageous outcome in the game.
Even though both these games have a unique Nash equilibrium, the moti-
vation to opt for a mutually beneficial outcome may prevail. This is because
players are aware of the fact that, if each of them pursues his or her personal
goals individualistically, they will end up at suboptimal, Pareto inefficient out-
comes (in the weak sense of Pareto efficiency). According to orthodox game
theorists, games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma are trivial, since they contain
a unique rational outcome in terms of individualistic reasoning. Many peo-
ple outside this field, however, feel that cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game is not unreasonable. We believe that the major source of controversy and
disagreement about this game may lie with the fact that some people tend to
think about it from the perspective of team’s interests.
It is possible to provide two interpretations of what happens when decision-
makers’ mode of reasoning undergoes a shift from individualistic to reasoning as
members of a team in these cases. According to one interpretation, individuals
who reason as members of a team identify the uniquely rational outcome from
the perspective of team’s interests with other options no longer appearing to
them as rational solutions of these games. According to another interpretation
and one that is in line with the deliberative processes we discussed in the pre-
ceding examples, individuals who reason as members of a team recognize the
existence of two rational solutions — one in terms of individualistic reasoning
and the other from the perspective of team’s interests. This leaves their chosen
courses of actions undetermined and rationalizable in two ways. It is only the
latter interpretation, however, that turns these games into genuine dilemmas for
the interacting decision-makers, since only those individuals who will identify in
such cases two distinct rational solutions will be puzzled about how to proceed.
Indeterminacy of the Rank-Based Function
It is not always the case that the proposed rank-based function yields a unique
solution to a group of individuals who are reasoning as members of a team. For
an example consider a slightly different version of the Chicken game illustrated
in Figure 8. As in the previous case, this game has two Nash equilibria: (U , L)
and (D , R). The row and the column players’ preferential rankings of outcomes
and their personal maximin threshold points are shown below.
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L R
U 3, 2 0, 0
D 1, 1 2, 3
Figure 8: The Chicken game (version 2)
Row player:

(U,L) 3
(D,R) 2
⇒ (D,L) 1
(U,R) 0
 Column player:

(D,R) 3
(U,L) 2
⇒ (D,L) 1
(U,R) 0

Here the outcome (U , L) advances the row and the column players’ personal
interests by 2 and 1 units respectively. The outcome (D , R) does so by 1 and
2 units respectively. The minimal advancement of personal interests across the
two players as well as the extent of mutual advantage that is provided by both
outcomes is 1. Hence the attainment of either one of these two outcomes remains
a viable goal for a team. As a result, this game poses a coordination problem
for individualistically reasoning decision-makers as well as those who reason as
members of a team and further methods for resolving this game may be sought.
We will briefly return to this idea in section 5.
Normative vs. Descriptive Status
It may be asked whether the theory of team reasoning operationalized using
the proposed function of team’s interests is a normative or a descriptive theory
of choice in interdependent decision situations. The answer, in our view, is
somewhat mixed and depends largely on the type of decision problem individuals
face. We propose to classify games using the following four categories: [1]
games with multiple Nash equilibria, [2] games with a unique inefficient Nash
equilibrium (in the weak sense of Pareto efficiency) [3] games with a unique
efficient Nash equilibrium (in the weak sense of Pareto efficiency) and [4] games
with no Nash equilibria, where in all four categories we refer to Nash equilibria
in pure strategies alone.
In the case of category [1] — games with multiple Nash equilibria — we
suggest that the theory of team reasoning has a strong normative appeal and
that a shift in the interacting players’ mode of reasoning from individualistic to
that as members of a team is likely from the descriptive point of view as well.
Individualistic best-response reasoning, albeit provides a number of rational so-
lutions, does not resolve these games fully in terms of providing a definitive
course of actions for the decision-makers to take. The theory of team reason-
ing operationalized as above, however, suggests that best-response reasoning
is not the endpoint of rational deliberation and provides a rational resolution
of these games based on the notion of mutually advantageous advancement of
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the interacting players’ personal interests. As such, if one agrees with the pro-
posed definition of mutual advantage and the suggested axioms to characterize
the interests of a team, the rank-based function of team’s interests provides a
normatively compelling basis for resolving these games. Whether the switch to
reasoning as a member of a team fully resolves such games, of course, depends
on whether the outcome selected by the function of team’s interests is unique.
This, as illustrated earlier, may not always be the case and other methods for
resolving such scenarios may be required. In many cases, however, a switch to
reasoning as a member of a team does resolve these games definitively and we
take this switch to be a natural progression in a player’s rational deliberative
process in an attempt to resolve such games when best-response reasoning fails
to do so.
In the case of category [2] the answer is less clear. These games have a
unique Nash equilibrium and, as such, individualistic best-response reasoning
resolves them fully. However, having identified the uniquely optimal outcomes
based on individualistic best-response reasoning, the interacting players may
easily recognize their unappealing inefficiencies. This, in turn, may prompt
them to identify mutually advantageous outcomes from the perspective of team’s
interests. From the descriptive point of view we expect this to happen often,
making such cases genuine dilemmas for the interacting decision-makers due to
the existence of multiple differently rationalizable resolutions of these games.
From the normative point of view, however, multiple courses of actions remain
possible: some based on the principles of best-response reasoning and others
based on those of mutually advantageous team play. As a result, a decision-
maker who has recognized both modes of reasoning in such games will have to
decide on which underlying principles to base his or her choice.
In the case of category [3] individualistic best-response reasoning resolves
these games fully and efficiently. As such, there is no need for team reasoning in
order to resolve these games efficiently and we do not expect people to reason
as members of a team from the descriptive point of view either.
Finally, in the case of category [4] similarly as was the case with category [1]
we suggest the theory of team reasoning to have a strong normative appeal, since
individualistic best-response reasoning provides no definitive solutions in these
games. In particular scenarios — those in which the function of team’s interests
is able to identify uniquely rational solutions — we also expect a shift in decision-
makers’ mode of reasoning to provide a descriptively accurate explanation of the
chosen courses of action.
Payoff Intervals in Individual and Mutual Advantage
The rank-based function of team’s interests presented above is based on the
interacting players’ ordinal preferential rankings of outcomes in games and it
ignores the relative preferential intensities in the players’ pairwise comparisons
of those outcomes. Suppose a player prefers some outcome x to the outcome y
and the outcome y to the outcome z. The function presented thus far considers
the player’s preferential ranking of the three outcomes, but ignores the informa-
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tion on whether the player prefers x to y by a greater, lesser or the same extent
as he or she prefers y to z. The standard axioms of rationality, however, make
the ratios of payoff intervals between different pairs of outcomes to be meaning-
ful representations of decision-makers’ relative preferential intensities. We now
present a slight modification of the above approach that takes the information
about such preferential intensities into account.
We introduce the following modification for determining the number of units
by which a shift from one outcome to another is said to advance a particular
player’s personal interests. First, each player’s personal payoffs associated with
the available outcomes in games are normalized to assign the least preferred
outcome the payoff value of 0 and the most preferred outcome the payoff value
of 100. This is done by applying an appropriate positive affine transformation of
personal payoffs. For example, if a particular player’s preferences over four out-
comes in a game are represented by payoff values 0, 1, 2 and 3, the normalization
transforms these into 0, 33, 67 and 100 respectively. After this normalization,
a shift from one outcome to another that results in an increase in the assigned
normalized personal payoff value of 1 for some player is said to advance that
player’s personal interests by 1 unit. Apart from this modification, the three
axioms introduced earlier, the definitions of individual and mutual advantage
and the description of the rank-based function of team’s interests all remain
unchanged. In the next two paragraphs we adapt the formal representation of
the function of team’s interests from the one presented earlier to the modified
version of team’s interests here.
Let Γ be a normal form game defined as a triple (I, Si, u
∗
i ) where I =
{1, 2, . . . ,m} is a finite set of m players, Si is a set of pure strategies available
to player i ∈ I, and u∗i (s) is a normalized payoff function that assigns to every
player i ∈ I a personal payoff for each outcome in the game in a way that the
least and the most preferred outcomes are given the values 0 and 100 respec-
tively. An outcome of a game is defined as a strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sm)
where si ∈ Si is a particular pure strategy chosen by player i ∈ I. Let Σ be the
set of all possible strategy profiles (i.e. outcomes) in the game Γ and sYi ∈ Σ
be a strategy profile that is associated with player i’s maximin payoff level in
the game.
The rank-based function of team’s interests Fτ : Σ → Στ , where Στ ⊆ Σ, is
a choice function that selects a subset from the set of all possible strategy profiles
of the game Γ such that each selected strategy profile maximizes the minimum
difference, across all players, between the normalized payoff value of the selected
profile and the normalized payoff value of the strategy profile associated with a
particular player’s personal maximin payoff level in the game. In other words,
each element sτ ∈ Στ is such that sτ = max
s∈Σ
{min
i∈I
[
u∗i (s)− u∗i (sYi)
]}.
In the case of all of the examples discussed earlier the prescriptions of both
versions of the rank-based function are the same. For an example of where these
differ consider the game illustrated in Figure 9(A). This game has two Nash
equilibria: (U , L) and (D , R). The row and the column players’ preferential
rankings of outcomes are shown below with each player’s normalized payoffs
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L R
U 5, 2 1, 0
D 0, 1 4, 10
A
L R
U 100, 20 20, 0
D 0, 10 80, 100
B
Figure 9: An example where payoff intervals matter
given in parentheses. The same game, but using the two players’ normalized
payoffs is illustrated in Figure 9(B).
Row player:

(U,L) 3 (100)
(D,R) 2 (80)
⇒ (U,R) 1 (20)
(D,L) 0 (0)
 Column player:

(D,R) 3 (100)
(U,L) 2 (20)
⇒ (D,L) 1 (10)
(U,R) 0 (0)

Using the preferential rank value numbers 0 to 3, the outcome (U , L) ad-
vances the row and the column players’ personal interests by 2 and 1 units
respectively. The outcome (D , R) does so by 1 and 2 units respectively. The
minimal advancement of personal interests across both players as well as the
extent of mutual advantage that is provided by either of the two outcomes is 1.
As such, the approach that considers the preferential rank value numbers does
not discriminate between the two outcomes further and the attainment of either
one of these is a viable goal in team play.
It may seem, however, that the outcome (D , R) is in some sense better for
a team than the outcome (U , L). This is because the former results in the row
player attaining a payoff that is almost as good as the best possible payoff to
him or her in this game and the column player attaining a payoff that is far
better than any of the other three possibilities. This reasoning is captured by
the modified approach as follows. Using the normalized payoff values 0 to 100,
the outcome (U , L) advances the row and the column players’ personal interests
by 80 and 10 units respectively. The outcome (D , R) does so by 60 and 90 units
respectively. The minimal advancement of personal interests across players as
well as the extent of mutual advantage provided by the outcome (U , L) is now
10 and that provided by the outcome (D , R) — 60. As a result, the rank-based
function of team’s interests in the modified approach favours the outcome (D ,
R).
5 Conclusion
In this paper we argued against the operationalization of the theory of team rea-
soning with the use of the maximization of the average of individuals’ personal
payoffs as a representation of team’s interests. Our arguments focused on its
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reliance on making interpersonal comparisons of the interacting players’ payoffs
and a possible advocacy of a complete sacrifice of some individuals’ personal
interests for the benefit of other players. While only a subset of the existing
texts on the theory of team reasoning make a reference to the maximization of
average payoffs, most of the remaining literature in this field does not endorse
a specific function and instead focuses on specifying a number of general con-
ditions for a candidate function of team’s interests to satisfy. We attempted to
fill this gap by proposing a rank-based function of team’s interests as a possible
alternative that is in line with the orthodox conception of payoffs and is based
on the notion of mutual advantage in team play that is compatible with the
idea suggested by Sugden (2011, 2015).
While the proposed rank-based function of team’s interests fits with some
experimental findings from games discussed in this paper, further empirical tests
will need to be constructed to test this model’s empirical validity. In principle
this task is possible, since the rank-based function of team’s interests provides
testable predictions in many types of games.
The second area requiring further research concerns cases where the pro-
posed rank-based function of team’s interests does not yield a unique solution.
Bardsley et al. (2010) consider possible scenarios where the Pareto efficiency
criterion may be abandoned in such cases. An example is the Enlarged Hi-Lo
game illustrated in Figure 10. In this game the rank-based function identifies
Hi 1 Hi 2 Lo
Hi 1 10, 10 0, 0 0, 0
Hi 2 0, 0 10, 10 0, 0
Lo 0, 0 0, 0 9, 9
Figure 10: The Enlarged Hi-Lo game
team’s interests with the attainment of outcomes (Hi 1 , Hi 1 ) or (Hi 2 , Hi 2 )
but does not discriminate further among the two. One way to proceed for a
team in this case is to abandon the Pareto efficiency criterion and instead focus
on the attainment of the outcome (Lo, Lo) for the sake of successful coordi-
nation of players’ actions. This suggests that the function of team’s interests
may need to be developed further to account for such scenarios. Another pos-
sibility is to separate the question of which outcomes in a considered game are
the best from the point of view of mutually advantageous team play from the
question of how to coordinate players’ actions having identified the best out-
comes. From this point of view, the Enlarged Hi-Lo game could be seen to have
three rational solutions in terms of individualistic reasoning and two rational
solutions in terms of mutually advantageous team play. This would prompt the
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decision-makers to seek further methods for coordinating their actions among
the team-optimal outcomes first and, if no coordination was possible among
these, revert back to considering suboptimal outcomes from the perspective of
team’s interests — such as the outcome (Lo, Lo) in the above example — to
seek possible coordination among those.
Finally, the exact ways by which the interacting individuals arrive at the
conclusions predicted by the rank-based function of team’s interests depend on
what is responsible for triggering shifts in people’s mode of reasoning from indi-
vidualistic to reasoning as members of a team and vice versa. While we did not
discuss the various accounts addressing this question in the existing literature,
we presented a possible suggestion according to which a shift in individuals’
mode of reasoning may come about as a result of extended reasoning in games
by otherwise individualistically rational agents. Further research into this possi-
bility would allow to bridge the gap between the two modes of reasoning within
the framework of non-cooperative game theory.
Appendix
We here show that the rank-based function of team’s interests presented above
satisfies the three axioms introduced in section 4.
Axiom 1 (Weak Pareto optimality): If an outcome x of a game is strictly
preferentially dominated by some other outcome y for all players, then the out-
come x is not chosen by the team.
Suppose that an outcome selected by the rank-based function of team’s interests
does not satisfy this axiom. In other words, suppose that some outcome x that
is selected by a team is strictly preferentially dominated by some other outcome
y. Following the notation introduced in section 4, let the two outcomes x and
y be denoted as strategy profiles sx, sy ∈ Σ respectively. Since sy strictly
preferentially dominates sx, it is the case that (i) for every player i ∈ I, ℘i(sy) >
℘i(s
x) and/or u∗i (s
y) > u∗i (s
x), where ℘i(s) is player i’s preferential rank value
and u∗i (s) is player i’s normalized payoff value associated with the strategy
profile s ∈ Σ.
By Axiom 2, any outcome that is selected by a team is, for every player, at
least as good as the outcome associated with his or her personal maximin payoff
level in the game. This means that (ii) for every player i ∈ I, ℘i(sx) ≥ ℘i(sYi)
and/or u∗i (s
x) ≥ u∗i (sYi). Combining (i) and (ii) gives
min
i∈I
[
℘i(s
y)− ℘i(sYi)
]
> min
i∈I
[
℘i(s
x)− ℘i(sYi)
]
and/or
min
i∈I
[
u∗i (s
y)− u∗i (sYi)
]
> min
i∈I
[
u∗i (s
x)− u∗i (sYi)
]
Hence,
sx 6= max
s∈Σ
{min
i∈I
[
℘i(s)− ℘i(sYi)
]}
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and/or
sx 6= max
s∈Σ
{min
i∈I
[
u∗i (s)− u∗i (sYi)
]}
and so sx /∈ Στ .
Axiom 2 (Preservation of personal security): Team play cannot leave any
player worse-off than his or her personal maximin payoff level in a game.
Let sYi ∈ Si be player i’s maximin (pure) strategy in a game. Let sY =
(sY1 , . . . , s
Y
m) be a strategy profile where each player i ∈ I plays his or her
maximin (pure) strategy sYi ∈ Si. Every player preferentially ranks all strategy
profiles that are associated with his or her maximin strategy in the game at
least as high as the strategy profile(s) associated with his or her maximin payoff
level in the game. As such, for every player i ∈ I, ℘i(sY) ≥ ℘i(sYi) and/or
u∗i (s
Y) ≥ u∗i (sYi). Since the strategy profile sY ∈ Σ exists in every game, it
cannot be the case that
sx = max
s∈Σ
{min
i∈I
[
℘i(s)− ℘i(sYi)
]}
and/or
sx = max
s∈Σ
{min
i∈I
[
u∗i (s)− u∗i (sYi)
]}
such that, for some player i ∈ I, ℘i(sx) < ℘i(sYi) and/or u∗i (sx) < u∗i (sYi).
Axiom 3 (Maximal mutual advantage): An outcome selected by a team
has to be maximally mutually advantageous.
The extent of individual advantage provided by a strategy profile s ∈ Σ to a
particular player i ∈ I is given by ℘i(s) − ℘i(sYi) and/or u∗i (s) − u∗i (sYi). Let
d(s) denote the extent of mutual advantage provided by the strategy profile
s ∈ Σ to the interacting players. Since the extent of mutual advantage is
given by the number of units the strategy profile s ∈ Σ advances all players’
personal interests in parallel relative to the strategy profile(s) associated with
each player’s personal maximin payoff level in the game, it is the case that, for
every player i ∈ I, ℘i(s)− ℘i(sYi) ≥ d(s) and/or u∗i (s)− u∗i (sYi) ≥ d(s).
Suppose that some strategy profile sx ∈ Σ is selected by a team that is not
maximally mutually advantageous. In other words, there exists another strategy
profile sy ∈ Σ such that d(sy) > d(sx). It then follows from the above that
min
i∈I
[
℘i(s
y)− ℘i(sYi)
]
> min
i∈I
[
℘i(s
x)− ℘i(sYi)
]
and/or
min
i∈I
[
u∗i (s
y)− u∗i (sYi)
]
> min
i∈I
[
u∗i (s
x)− u∗i (sYi)
]
Hence
sx 6= max
s∈Σ
{min
i∈I
[
℘i(s)− ℘i(sYi)
]}
and/or
sx 6= max
s∈Σ
{min
i∈I
[
u∗i (s)− u∗i (sYi)
]}
and so sx /∈ Στ .
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